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COMMENTS
This Symposium is devoted to a consideration of the means
by which a state can render a valid personal judgment against
a nonresident defendant. But we are not concerned with the non-
resident defendant who is personally served with process within
the forum state; jurisdiction in such a case is unquestionable.
Neither does this Symposium consider the nonresident defendant
who actually consents to or waives objection to the jurisdiction
of the state of the forum expressly or by general appearance in
the litigation; personal jurisdiction, unlike jurisdiction over the
subject matter, can be obtained by the consent or waiver of the
parties. Our concern is the nonresident defendant, corporate or
individual, who has not been personally served within the juris-
diction, has not made a general appearance in the action, and has
not actually consented to be sued in the state of the forum.
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM - THE DUE PROCESS
FRAMEWORK AND THE LOUISIANA EXPERIENCE
Although the expansion of personal jurisdiction1 over non-
resident defendants 2 is being accomplished by individual states,
it is occurring within a federal system. To give the states the
unbridled right to extend their judicial power beyond their
boundaries would be incompatible with federalism: to give each
state sovereignty over the citizens of every other state renders
the concept of "state" meaningless. The United States Consti-
tution, therefore, imposes certain limitations on the development
of the doctrine. In order to place the remainder of this Sym-
posium in the proper federal context, this introductory Comment
will attempt to discern the constitutional limits within which the
states will be allowed to take jurisdiction, and to determine to
what extent Louisiana has occupied the permitted area.
1. "Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and deter-
mine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to
grant the relief to which they are entitled." LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1
(1960). In order to render a valid personal judgment, a court must have juris-
diction over both the subject matter of the dispute, i.e., the particular class of
action or proceeding involved, id. art. 2, and the person, i.e., the legal power
and authority to render a personal judgment against the parties involved, id. art. 6.
This Symposium considers only the latter requirement.
2. Since personal jurisdiction, unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter,
can be obtained by the consent or waiver of the parties, RESTATEMENT, JUDG-
MENTS §§ 18-19 (1942), any party who appears in a court to institute suit con-
sents to that court's jurisdiction over his person. Thus there can never be any
problem with respect to the court's jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDS
A. The Basic Principles
Pennoyer v. Neff8 is the landmark case in the area of
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. Under the fourteenth
amendment, due process requirements for a valid judgment 4 were
held to be the same as those for full faith and credit :5 jurisdic-
tion over the subject and jurisdiction over the person.
Three principles of personal jurisdiction were established by
Pennoyer:
1. A valid personal judgment can be rendered only by a
court with personal jurisdiction over the defendant at the incep-
tion of the suit.,
2. Mere situs within the forum of property owned by a non-
resident defendant does not vest a court with jurisdiction to
render a personal judgment against him.7 This holding under-
cut many state statutes resting on the assumption that although
a personal judgment against a nonresident based on substituted
service could not be enforced elsewhere, either under full faith
and credit or through comity, such a judgment could be enforced
against property of the nonresident within the state.
3. If a court has no jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant, it cannot acquire jurisdiction merely by serving process
upon him by publication within the forum state.8 This restric-
tion seems to be based on the lack of reasonable probability of
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Id. at 733: "[P]roceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction, do
not constitute due process of law. Whatever difficulty may be experienced in
giving to those terms a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion
of power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there can be
no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings. They then mean
a course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforce-
ment of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a
tribunal competent by its constitution- that is, by the law of its creation - to
pass upon the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a deter-
mination of the personal liability of the defendant, he ,must be brought within
its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appear-
ance."
5. Id. at 729. See also Goldey v. Morning News, 15M U.S. 518, 521 .(1894)
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850).
6. 95 U.S. 714, 727-28 (1877).
7. Id. at 723-26.
8. Id. at 727.
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notice under such a method of service.9 Since the Court did not
have before it a case in which a nonresident defendant had re-
ceived actual notice of the proceedings by service of process upon
him outside the state of the forum,' 0 statements by the Court
concerning the invalidity of such service of process" would seem
to be dicta.
Pennoyer recognizes three classes of exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of service within the forum :12 cases involving personal
status of a resident; 13 cases in which process was personally
served in the state on an agent actually designated by the non-
resident to receive service;14 and cases in which process was
served on a person designated by statute as the agent for serv-
ice of process for any person acting therein who fails to appoint
an agent as required by a valid state statute.
It is this last class of exceptions which has given rise to the
greatest amount of litigation. And it is with this area that the
remainder of this Comment is concerned. Our immediate task
9. Ibid.: "Substituted service by publication, or in any other authorized form,
may be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings taken where
property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or some equiva-
lent act. The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner,
in person or by agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will in-
form him, not only that it is taken into the custody of the court, but that he must
look to any proceedings authorized by law upon such seizure for its condemna-
tion and sale. Such service may also be sufficient in cases where the object of
the action is to reach and dispose of property in the State, or of some interest
therein, by enforcing a contract or a lien respecting the same, or to partition
it among different owners, or, when the public is a party, to condemn and ap-
propriate it for a public purpose. In other words, such service may answer in
all actions which are substantially proceedings in rem."
10. Id. at 720.
11. Id. at 722, 727, 733.
12. Id. at 734-35. See McMahon, JURISDICTION UNDER THE LOUISIANA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 35 TUL. L. REV. 501, 507 (1961).
13. The discussion of this exception is not within the scope of this Sym-
posium. It is based on the clear interest which a state has in being able to deter-
mine the status and capacities of its citizens. The mere fact that the person in
relation to whom the citizen's status is sought to be determined happens to be a
nonresident does not preclude the exercise of that power of determination.
14. This class of exceptions presents only one real problem: the scope to be
given to an actual designation of an agent. This question was presented to the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling
Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). A nonresident corporation had appointed an agent
for service of process in Missouri as a condition to its being allowed to transact
business there. In an action arising out of a Colorado contract, the company was
sued in Missouri and process was served on the appointed agent. In upholding
the jurisdiction of the Missouri court, Justice Holmes stated that when the power
to receive service "actually is conferred by a document, the party executing it
takes the risk of the interpretation that may be put on it by the Courts." Id. at
96. See also Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1915).
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is to trace the differentiation and expansion of the concept of
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents from Pennoyer to the
enunciation of the present rule, and then to probe the limits set
by that rule.
B. Differentiation and Expansion
Before the advent of the automobile, the bulk of interstate
contacts was through corporations. And since corporations are
excluded from the protections of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the Constitution,' " the development of personal
jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants was much
more rapid than was jurisdiction over nonresident individuals.
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Corporations
The early judicial view was that "a corporation can have no
legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which
it is created."'16 Even before Pennoyer, however, this view had
yielded to a less rigid one. Though it was still maintained that
a corporation could exist only in the state of its creation, its ex-
istence there might be "recognized" in other states. "Its resi-
dence in one state creates no insuperable objection to its power
of contracting in another."1 Since it was recognized that a non-
resident corporation might, through its agent, transact business
in another state, it was held that the latter state could deem this
employee the corporation's agent for service of process. 8 "The
inquiry is, not whether the defendant was personally within the
State, but whether he, or someone authorized to act for him in
reference to the suit, had notice and appeared; or, if he did not
appear, whether he was bound to appear or suffer a judgment
by default."19
15. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1868): "The term citizen"
as there used applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic, owing
allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and
possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed."
16. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839): "It is very
true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the
sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law; and
where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation
can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty."
17. Id. at 588.
18. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
19, Id. at 407.
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The right of the state to deem the representative of the cor-
poration its agent for service of process was grounded on the
state's right to exclude a nonresident corporation from trans-
acting any business at all there. Since the state has exclusionary
power, it can condition its consent to the corporation's acting
within its borders if the conditions are not "repugnant to the
constitution or laws of the United States, or inconsistent with
those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and au-
thority of each State from encroachment by all others, or that
principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without
opportunity for defense. ' 20 Broadly stated, the conditions must
be reasonable.
The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution presents
special problems concerning state regulation of foreign corpora-
tions. A state may not exclude a corporation engaged in inter-
state commerce, 21 but "the State may pass laws enforcing the
rights of a citizen which affect commerce, but fall short of regu-
lating such commerce in the sense in which the Constitution
gives exclusive jurisdiction to Congress. ' 22 Regulation within
these limits is permissible since the corporation and its property
within the state receive the protection of state laws, making it
only fair that the states be able to protect effectively their citi-
zens from breach of those laws by the corporation.23
Allowing a state to designate a representative of a corpora-
tion transacting business there as the corporation's agent to re-
ceive process brought foreign corporations squarely within one
of the exceptions to the general rule stated in Pennoyer. Serv-
ice of process on designated agents was accepted as sufficient
to bring the corporation within the jurisdiction of a state court,24
but only if the corporation could be said to be actually "doing
business" in the jurisdiction.25 Service on an agent "only cas-
20. Ibid. The Court continues: "It cannot be deemed unreasonable that the
State of Ohio should endeavor to secure to its citizens a remedy, in their domestic
forum, upon this important class of contracts made and to be performed within
that State, and fully subject to its laws; nor that proper means should be used
to compel foreign corporations, transacting this business of insurance within the
State, for their benefit and profit, to answer there for the breach of their con-
tracts of insurance there made and to be performed."
21. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877) ; Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
22. Davis v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 217 U.S. 157, 179 (1910).
23. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S 579, 588 (1914).
24. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
25. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) ; Henrietta
Mining & Milling Co. v. Johnson, 173 U.S. 221 (1899).
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ually within the state, and not charged with any business of
the corporation there," would not be sufficient.2 6
The Supreme Court has used - and discarded- three tests
to establish the forum's power to subject a non-consenting for-
eign corporation to suit in the state: implied consent,27 pres-
ence,28 and doing business.29
In Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French o the Supreme Court ini-
tiated the judicial fiction of inferring consent by a nonresident
corporation to the jurisdiction of a state court from the mere
fact that the corporation did business in the state, and the state
conditioned its permission for a nonresident corporation to act
within its borders on such consent.3 1 The scope of such "implied
consent" was sharply restricted, however, to causes of action
arising out of the business done within the state. The Court
refused to extend the fictive consent to causes of action arising
in another state.3 2
In an attempt to make the theory of jurisdiction over cor-
porations more consistent with that of jurisdiction over natural
persons, the Court developed the "presence" test. The test took
the legal fiction of corporate personality as its starting point,
and considered a corporation, like a natural person, subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of a foreign state when present
there and duly served with process. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. stated that a corporation is present in a foreign state, and
must respond to process served there upon its agent, only if it
is doing business within the state "in such a manner and to
such an extent as to warrant the inference that through its
agents it was present there. ' 33
26. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 522 (1894).
27. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882); Lafayette Ins. Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
28. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)
Green v. Chicago, B & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
29. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
See also Henrietta Mining & Milling Co. v. Johnson, 173 U.S. 221 (1899).
30. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
31. Id. at 408.
32. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907):
"(lit cannot be held that the company agreed that service of process upon the
Insurance Commissioner of that Commonwealth would alone be sufficient to bring
it into court in respect of all 'business transacted by it, no matter where, with or
for the benefit of the citizens of Pennsylvania."
33. 205 U.S. 530, 532 (1907).
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The "presence" test was developed in an attempt to justify
holding service of process in the state upon an agent equivalent
to service upon the nonresident corporation. But the theory pre-
sented conceptual difficulties. It seems logically inconsistent to
find corporate presence based on the presence of agents when
natural persons are not considered present in the same circum-
stances.
As the requirement of jurisdiction over the person differen-
tiated into two sub-requirements - sufficient connection to jus-
tify the state's exercise of judicial power, and a reasonable at-
tempt to notify the person of the proceedings - the Court, in
dealing with corporations, began to shift the primary focus of
its inquiry from the validity of the process served to the rela-
tionship between the state and the corporation. It was realized
that both the "implied consent" test and the "presence" test de-
pended upon a determination that the foreign corporation was
"doing business" in the state - that its activities were such that
the state could validly exercise the legal power to make judicial
determinations concerning the corporation. International Har-
vester Co. v. Kentucky held that solicitation of orders through
local agents who also received payment for merchandise deliv-
ered in the state was a "continuous course of business" suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction. 34  However, the Court continued
to act within the strictures of the "solicitation plus" rule of
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.35 And the fact that a subsidiary
corporation was "doing business" within a state was held insuf-
34. 234 U.S. 579, 585, 587 (1914).
35. 205 U.S. 530, 533 (1907): "The business shown in this case was in
substance nothing more than that of solicitation. Without undertaking to formu-
late any general rule defining what transactions will constitute 'doing business'
in the sense that liability to service is incurred, we think that this is not enough
to bring the defendant within the district so that process can be served upon it."
See People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918),
where it was held that a continuous practice of advertising and solicitation "did
not amount to that doing of business which subjects the corporation to the local
jurisdiction for the purpose of service of process upon it."
See also Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140, 145
(1923), where the Court said: "[I]t cannot be said that the Association was
doing business in Montana merely because one or more members, without au-
thority to obligate it, solicited new members. That is not enough 'to warrant the
inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and
is by its duly authorized officers or agents present within the State or district
where service is attempted.'
"It also seems sufficiently clear . . . that an insurance corporation is not doing
business within a State merely because it insures lives of persons living therein,
mails notices addressed to beneficiaries at their homes and pays losses by checks
from its home office."
But see Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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ficient to subject the parent corporation to the jurisdiction of
that state, if the subsidiary was in fact a separate legal en-
tity.36
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals
The fiction that foreign corporations implicitly consent to
the jurisdiction of states within which they transact business
was founded upon the doctrine that a state could exclude a for-
eign corporation altogether, and therefore could condition its
entry. Under the privileges and immunities clause of the Con-
stitution37 however, there is no basis for a general right of ex-
clusion of nonresident individuals. 8
Nevertheless, the protection which the privileges and immu-
nities clause provides for individuals does not completely bar
state regulation of the activities of nonresident individuals. Un-
der its police power, a state may make certain demands of non-
residents acting within its boundaries, so long as the regulations
be "not enacted for the purpose of creating an arbitrary or vexa-
tious discrimination against nonresidents." 39 Neither the privi-
leges and immunities clause nor the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires that the terms imposed
be "technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded
to resident citizens. ' 40
Within these limitations the states were able to gain juris-
diction over nonresident individuals by providing that an in-
36. Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 205 U.S. 364 (1907).
37. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) : "[T]he clause
plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State
to pass to any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful
commerce, trade, or business without molestation; to acquire personal property;
to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in the courts of the State; and
to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises that are imposed by the State upon
its own citizens."
38. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (19). Action in Illinois to enforce
Kentucky judgment against defendant, an individual resident of Illinois. A Ken-
tucky statute made a business agent in the State the agent to receive process in
suits arising out of the business done in Kentucky. Process was served in Ken-
tucky on an agent of the defendant. Plaintiff claims that defendant consented to
service under this statute by the fact of his doing business in the state, and is
therefore bound by the Kentucky judgment. In holding the Kentucky statute
invalid, Justice Holmes stated, id. at 293: "[T]he consent that it said to be
implied . . . is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States
could exclude foreign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this
obligation as a condition to letting them in. . . . The State has no power to ex-
clude the defendants."
39. Canadian No. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 559 (1920).
40. Id. at 562.
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dividual "consents" to the jurisdiction of the state's courts for
any cause of action which might arise out of acts falling within
the regulations of the police power. The two generally accepted
activities subject to police power regulations are those which are
"dangerous" and those, characterized as "special," in which the
state has a federally recognized regulatory interest.
The personal mobility which grew with the automobile in-
dustry provided the most pressing area for regulation of dan-
gerous activities by transient nonresidents. 41 Statutes granting
a state jurisdiction over nonresident motorists were upheld as
reasonable regulation of a state's highways, provided that they
were not discriminatory against the nonresident or unduly bur-
densome on interstate commerce, 42 and that they provided pro-
cedures designed reasonably to insure that the nonresident would
receive actual notice of the pending proceedings. 4
The same provisos determined the validity of statutes pro-
viding for jurisdiction over nonresidents engaging in "special"
activities. 44 Statutes establishing jurisdiction were acknowl-
edged as necessary in both areas to enforce civil and criminal
sanctions. 45
Summary
A state's authority over domestic corporations and individual
residents or citizens exists as a necessary corollary of the prin-
ciple of public law enunciated in Pennoyer: "every state pos-
sesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory. ' 4  This authority is not termi-
nated by the temporary departure of the citizen from the state:
"Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent de-
41. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915): "The movement of
motor vehicles over the highway is attended by constant and serious danger to the
public, and is also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.
"In the absence of national legislation covering the subject a State may right-
fully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect
to the operation on its highways of all motor vehicles -those moving in interstate
commerce as well as others. . . . This is but an exercise of the police power . .
essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens;
and it does not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce."
42. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916).
43. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
44. See, e.g., Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935)
(sale of corporate securities).
45. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
46. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
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fendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes
of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted
service. '47 The validity of the court's judgment turns upon
fair notice.
Prior to the 1940's, jurisdiction over foreign corporations
depended directly or indirectly upon a finding that the cor-
poration was "doing business" to a significantly greater extent
than mere solicitation. Jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
depended upon actual service of process within the territory,
unless it could be based on one of the growing number of activi-
ties subject to state regulation under the police power.48
C. The Present Requirements
The Question of Power
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had issued the warning in
1917: "In States bound together by a Constitution and subject
to the Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not
to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a
pretty close adhesion to facts."49 The echo of these words re-
turned to the Supreme Court a quarter of a century later, as the
Court began to acknowledge the fictional basis of some of its
decisions concerning jurisdiction over nonresidents. "Implied
consent" was fictitious; jurisdiction ostensibly based on that test
was more realistically justified by the nature of the acts done
within the state.50 Corporate "presence" was recognized as a
symbol for "those activities of the corporation's agents within
the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process." 51
47. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940).
48. But see Campbell, Jurisdiction over Nonresident individuals and Foreign
Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause, 36 TUL. L. REv. 663 (1962).
49. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
50. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
51. Id. at 316-17: "Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a
fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, . . . it is clear that
unlike an individual its 'presence' without, as well as within, the state of its
origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who
are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there
as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance
of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided.
For the terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities
of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient
to satisfy the demands of due process ... " See also Hutchinson v. Chase & Gil-
bert, 45 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1930).
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Minimum Contacts
The first rumblings of a change in the jurisdictional test for
nonresidents came not in a case involving jurisdiction but in a
contest of the right of a state to impose regulations on a non-
resident insurance corporation seeking to do business there.52
The corporation sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the
state requirement that corporations must submit to regulation
in order to do business. It was denied. Justice Black, speak-
ing for the Court, stated the issue: do the corporation's activi-
ties as a whole so affect the state's interests as to give the state
the power it claims ?5 The Court found "many actual contacts"
with the citizens and property of the state.54 Signing contracts
within a state, the absence of which had been so heavily relied
upon in denying jurisdiction in the past,55 was recognized as
only one of many means of contact.56 The Court upheld the regu-
lation, considering the location of activity before and after the
making of the contract, the degree of interest which the state
had in the objects insured, and the location of the insured prop-
erty.57
As a test of judicial jurisdiction, the new test was first voiced
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.5" The state initiated
in its courts proceedings against a nonresident corporation to
collect contributions to the state unemployment compensation
fund. The corporation had no office or merchandise in the state
and made no deliveries there in interstate commerce. However,
52. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
53. Id. at 316.
54. Id. at 319: "In the instant case, the reciprocals have . . . many actual
contacts with the New York subscribers and the New York property . . . , much
of the insurance covers permanent immovables, and the reciprocals have been
licensed to do business there for years."
55. See Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923).
56. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 317 (1943) : "The actual
physical signing of contracts may be only one element in a broad range of busi-
ness activities. Business may be done in a state although those doing the busi-
ness are scrupulously careful to see that not a single contract is ever signed within
that state's boundaries. Important as the execution of written contracts may be,
it is ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business negotia-
tions with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the busi-
ness transaction."
57. Id. at 319: "[I]n determining whether insurance business is done within
a state for the purpose of deciding whether a state has power to regulate the
business, considerations of the location of activity prior and subsequent to the
making of the contract ... , of the degree of interest of the regulating state in
the object insured, and of the location of the property insured, are separately and
collectively of great weight."
58. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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residents of the state were employed as soliciting agents, and
these agents occasionally rented display rooms to exhibit samples
and solicit orders. Notice of the pending action was served on
one of the agents, and a copy of the process was sent by regis-
tered mail to the corporation at its principal business address.
The Supreme Court rejected any simple mechanical or quan-
titative test to determine whether a nonresident may be sub-
jected to suit.5 9 Rather than use the "solicitation plus" rule of
the "doing business" test, the Court looked at the relation of
the activity to the state. "Whether due process is satisfied must
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of law which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations.""
The Court therefore enunciated a new, more flexible due
process test:
"Due process requires only that in order to subject a defend-
ant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice....
"Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corpora-
tion with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government, to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there."6
The new test was one of sufficient "minimum contacts," cer-
tainly a more flexible test than the ossified "doing business" rule
which it replaced. The standards for determining sufficiency of
contact, however, were such vague terms as "traditional notions
59. Id. at 319: "It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is
not merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the cor-
poration has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little
more or a little less."
60. Ibid,
61. Id. at 316-17.
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of fair play and substantial justice" and "reasonable." The
Court recognized the vagueness of the test but thought it no
more vague than those which it superseded, while far superior
to them in that it looked to the reality of the relationship be-
tween the state and the nonresident rather than to some fic-
tional consent or presence, and restored the flexibility necessary
to do justice between the parties.
.In finding the contacts which the nonresident corporation
had with the State of Washington sufficient to support the
state's claim to jurisdiction, the Court pointed out that the cor-
poration's activities were "systematic and continuous," resulting
in a "large volume of interstate business" and that the obligation
arose from these activities. The Court also stressed that the
corporation had "received the benefits and protection of the laws
of the state, including the right to resort to the courts for the
enforcement of its rights. '62 In establishing the "minimum
contacts" test, the Court declared:
"But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege
of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits
and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue. '6 3
In stating that a nonresident who receives the benefits of
the laws of a state might also be made to feel their pinch, the
Court elaborated a thread which had run through even the earli-
est jurisdiction cases.64 It is this point which may provide the
most definite line circumscribing the allowable area within which
a state may take personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants. The Court seems to be taking nonresidents from the sanc-
tuary of technicality and placing them in a situation analogous
to that of domiciliaries: the nonresident may not receive the
benefits of the laws of the state without also accepting its bur-
dens, including the burden of being subject to its jurisdiction
62. Id. at 320.
63. Id. at 319.
64.: St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
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upon reasonable notice and without the formality of service of
process within the state.65
Fairness
International Shoe subdivided the realm of personal jurisdic-
tion.,6 The inner limit, where jurisdiction of the state is un-
questioned, is the situation in which the nonresident's continu-
ous and systematic activities within the state give rise to the
liabilities sued upon.67 The casual presence of a nonresident, or
his conduct of single or isolated acts within the forum state, pre-
sents the opposite extreme, where it is generally agreed that the
contacts are insufficient to support a suit based on a cause of
action unrelated to the activities there. But when the activity
in the state, though continuous and systematic, does not give
rise to the liabilities sued upon,68 or when the liabilities arise
from single or occasional contacts within the state,69 there is un-
certainty, depending on the determination whether the contacts
with the state were of such a nature as to justify the suit against
the nonresident there.
If sufficient contacts are found to indicate that the nonresi-
dent has received the benefits of the laws of the state, there re-
mains the further consideration of the fairness of compelling
the nonresident to submit to suit away from its domicile. The
central considerations in this determination will be the conven-
ience of the forum: the relative cost to each of the parties of
being forced to bring or to defend against a suit at the domicile
of the other, balanced against their relative ability to bear this
cost, and the location of necessary witnesses.70 But the Court has
stated that mere convenience is not determinative :71 "It is es-
65. Compare Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See note 47 supra and
accompanying text. See generally Clearly & Seder, EBtended Jurisdictional Bases
for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 599, 600-03 (1955).
66. 326 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1945).
67. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) ; cf. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
68. Compare Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) with Perkins
v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
69. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
70. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Perkins
v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ; Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
71. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) "It is urged that because
the settlor and most of the appointees and beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
sential in each case that there be some act by which the defend-
ant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of its laws. ' 72 Convenience is a consideration only
after the test of minimum contacts is met.
The Requirement of Notice
Thus far we have been primarily concerned with the power
of the forum to render a personal judgment against a nonresi-
dent who has not been served with process within the jurisdic-
tion, and has neither made a general appearance in the action
nor actually consented to be sued in the forum. But, as indicated
previously, the requisites for valid personal jurisdiction are two-
fold. Power alone is not enough; it is required that there be
effective notice to the defendant.
As early as Pennoyer, it was agreed that it was not contrary
to "natural justice" that one who has agreed to receive a particu-
lar mode of notification of legal proceedings - for example, by
actual appointment of an agent for service of process - should
be bound by a judgment in which that particular mode of noti-
fication was followed, even though he may not have had actual
notice of the proceedings. 73 But when no agent has been volun-
tarily appointed, mere service on an agent designated by statute
or other such substituted service is not sufficient. "The substi-
tute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the least that
ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done. ' 74 If
process is served on a state officer designated by statute, the
nonresident must be advised by some written communiation so
as to make it reasonably probable that he will receive actual
notice; otherwise, the way would be open for fraud. There-
fore, any statute enabling a state to claim personal juris-
the courts of that State should be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident trustee. This is a non sequitur . . . . As we understand [Florida]
law, the trustee is an indispensable party over which the court must acquire juris-
diction before it is empowered to enter judgment in a proceeding affecting the
validity of a trust. It does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the 'center of
gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The
issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by
considering the acts of the trustee. As we have indicated, they are insufficient
to sustain the jurisdiction."
72. Id. at 253.
73. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Ex. 290,
154 Eng. Rep. 1221 (1849).
74. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
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diction over a nonresident defendant must require either the
plaintiff or some other person to communicate notice of the
pending proceedings to the defendant if the statute is to be
within the bounds of due process.75 If the service provided by
statute and employed in the case is "reasonably calculated" to
give the defendant actual notice of the pending proceedings and
an adequate opportunity to appear and be heard, "the traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice .. . implicit in due
process are satisfied. '76
Service on an agent of a corporation acting for it within the
state has been held to be a reasonable means of giving notice. 7
Another accepted method is mailing a copy of the process to the
defendant out of state by registered or certified mail, return re-
ceipt requested. 8 But service by publication, with nothing more,
has been held insufficient to inform those who could easily have
been informed by mail or some other means more likely to give
actual notice.7 9 "The means employed must be such as one de-
sirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt
to accomplish it."s°
75. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
76. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). See also International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945): "We
are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state
upon ,n agent whose activities establish appellant's 'presence' there was not suf-
ficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as
to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is
enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the par-
ticular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that
the notice will be actual. . . . Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of
suit to appellant by registered mail at its home office was not reasonably cal-
culated to apprise appellant of the suit."
78. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927).
79. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)
"It would be idle to pretend that publications alone .. . is a reliable means of
acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts.
It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the
question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded on
process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings to
the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in
the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the
newspaper's normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach
him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when, as
here, the notice, required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed
to attract, and does not inform acquaintances who might call it to their attention.
In weighing its sufficiency on the basis of equivalence with actual notice, we are
unable to regard this as more than a feint."
80. Ibid. The Court does recognize that there may be cases when service by
publication is the only possible means. "This Court has not hesitated to approve
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It should be noted that the test of jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents enunciated in International Shoe was based on general no-
tions of fairness requiring that a nonresident receiving the bene-
fits and protection of the laws of a state be also subject to suit
there. It would seem, therefore, that though the case involved
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation, the test
stated should be applicable as well to nonresident individuals,
with only those differences which the nature of the two types
of legal persons requires.8 ' The necessity of some distinction be-
tween corporations and natural persons seems to remain, how-
ever, because of the protection granted individuals under the
privileges and immunities clause. 2 Caution should be exercised
in claiming jurisdiction over an individual whose activities in
the state cannot be characterized as within the expandng area
subject to police power regulation.
II. LOUISIANA'S "LONG-ARM" LEGISLATION
Because personal jurisdiction over nonresidents is an extraor-
dinary deviation from the normally restricted scope of state ju-
risdiction, it does not exist unless provided by statute.
From as early as 1890,83 Louisiana has required foreign cor-
porations seeking a license to do business in the state to appoint
a resident agent to receive service of process in all actions aris-
ing from or connected with the business done in Louisiana.8 4 Be-
cause the Constitution prohibits a state from excluding a cor-
poration engaged in interstate commerce,8 5 and because the state
saw the necessity for means to hear claims against a corpora-
tion which did business in Louisiana without complying with
the requirement, the statutes provided that if the corporation
of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where
it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning. Thus it
has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment
of an indirect and even probably futile means of notification is all that the situa-
tion permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their
rights." Id. at 317.
81. See Reese, Judicial Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: The Impact of McGee
v. International Life Insurance Company, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 139, 148
(1958).
82. See Campbell, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals and Foreign Cor-
porations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause, 36 TUL. L. REV. 663 (1962).
83. La. Acts 1890, No. 149, § 1.
84. For ordinary corporations, the present requirement is found in LA. R.S.
12:202(A) (1950). There are special provisions for foreign insurers. See note 89
infra, and accompanying text.
85. See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
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did not appoint an agent to receive process, or if the appointed
agent could not be located, process could be served on any agent
of the corporation found within the state on business of the cor-
poration."6 A 1914 statute8 7 further expanded the state's juris-
diction by providing for substituted service on the Secretary of
State if service could not be made on any agent of the corpora-
tion. The statute required the Secretary of State to give notice
to the defendant corporation by sending by registered mail the
originals of the papers served on him.88
In 1898 Louisiana enacted special legislation for foreign or
alien insurers, requiring appointment of the Secretary of State
as agent for service of process as a condition to doing business
in Louisiana.8 9 Provision was made for effective notice to the
nonresident insurer by registered mail. With only slight amend-
ment, this requirement is still in effect today,90 and it has been
complemented by provisions authorizing the Secretary of State
to receive process for insurance companies doing business in Lou-
isiana without having complied with the statute by making a
formal appointment.91
Until International Shoe Co. v. Washington92 it seemed that
Louisiana had covered all the possibilities for jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations which the Supreme Court had indicated
were available. After that decision had broadened the area with-
in which the state could claim jurisdiction, Louisiana enacted a
statute98 providing for service of process on any foreign cor-
poration "engaged in business activities in this state through
acts performed by its employees or agents in this state," by sub-
stituted service on the Secretary of State when, for any reason,
the corporation had not appointed an agent to receive process,
or such agents or any employees or agents of the corporation
could not be found within the state. The statute was restric-
tively interpreted, however, making its effect on the then exist-
ing law negligible.9 4 In 1960, after McGee v. International Life
86. La. Acts 1890, No. 149, § 2. The successor to this provision was trans-
ferred from LA. R.S. 13:3471 (5) (c) (1950) to LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
arts. 1261-1262 (1960).
87. La. Acts 1914, No. 267, § 26c.
88. Ibid.
89. La. Acts 1898, No. 105, art. II, § 1.
90. LA. R.S. 22:982, 985 (1950).
91. Id. 22:1253(A).
92. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
93. La. Acts 1950, No. 21, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 13:3471(D) (1950).
94. Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co., 71 So.2d 613 (La. App. 2d Cir.
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Ins. Co.,95 these provisions were greatly liberalized by substitu-
tion of the language "a business activity in this state" for the
quoted language of the 1950 amendment. 96 (Emphasis added.)
This seemingly minor amendment legislatively overruled the
judicial restriction placed on the statute, and enabled Louisiana
to take full advantage of the McGee rule with respect to cor-
porations.9 7
The Louisiana Direct Action Statute98 has considerable sig-
nificance in the area of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents,
although its principal effect is in suits against the insurers of
domiciliaries. The statute allows a person injured within the
State of Louisiana to bring an action here directly and solely
against the insurer of the party causing the injury. Any stipu-
lations against such direct action are specifically negated by the
statute, and it is inconsequential whether the contract was is-
sued or delivered in Louisiana, as long as the accident occurred
here.
After Hess v. Pawloski,99 Louisiana began to expand its ju-
risdiction over nonresident individuals by enacting its Nonresi-
dent Motorist Act. 100 As amended, that statute utilizes the fic-
tion that use of the public highways of the state by a nonresident
amounts to the "appointment" of the Secretary of State as agent
for service of process not only on the nonresident, but on his in-
surer or personal representative as well. A similar provision is
in the Foreign Watercraft Statute, 10 1 which provides that use
1954). The court interpreted "engaged in business activities" to require that the
corporation be carrying out a continuous intrastate business. But see Calcote v.
Century Indem. Co., 93 So.2d 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
95. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
96. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 13:3471 (1950).
97. See Babineaux v. Southeastern Drilling Corp., 170 So.2d 518 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965), writs refused, 247 La. 613, 172 So.2d 700 (1965), appeal dismissed,
382 U.S. 16 (1965).
98. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1950).
99. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
100. La. Acts 1930, No. 55, § 1, amending La. Acts 1819, No. 253, § 1, now LA.
R.S. 22:655 (1950). The statute has been broadened by amendment by La. Acts
1950, No. 541, § 1, La. Acts 1956, No. 475, § 1, and La. Acts 1958, No. 125,
§ 1. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) upheld the
constitutionality of the statute.
101. La. Acts 1928, No. 86, now LA. R.S. 13:3474-3475 (1950). The statute's
constitutionality was upheld in Roper v. Brooks, 201 La. 135, 9 So.2d 485
(1942). Subsequent amendments have broadened the provision considerably, by
providing that service on the Secretary of State will be valid against both his
insurer and his personal representative. La. Acts 1954, No. 136; La. Acts 1956,
No. 138; La. Acts 1958, No. 135. The service has been upheld as valid against
the insurer in Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F. Supp. 155
(E.D. La. 1958).
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of the navigable waters of the state is deemed the appointment
of the Secretary of State as agent for service of process on
the nonresident operator in any action based on a collision or
accident in which the vessel might be involved while in navigable
waters within the state.
The 1964 "Long-Arm" Statute
While these provisions, as amended after McGee, covered
foreign corporations adequately, the coverage of nonresident in-
dividuals was deficient. The Direct Action Statute, the Nonresi-
dent Motorist Act, and the Nonresident Watercraft Statute pro-
vided a large measure of coverage of nonresident individuals
committing delictual acts in the state, but there remained a con-
siderable gap in Louisiana's claim to personal jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals, partnerships, and unincorporated asso-
ciations entering into contracts and doing other non-delictual
acts in the state.1 2 This was the hiatus which the Louisiana
Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Statute10 ' was designed
to fill. The Louisiana statute is based on the Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act. 0 4 with the changes necessary
to adapt the statute to the Louisiana legislative scheme. It de-
fines "nonresident" as "an individual, his executor, administra-
tor, or other legal representative, who at the time of the filing
of the suit is not domiciled or residing in this state, or a partner-
ship, association, or any other legal or commercial entity (other
than a corporation) not then domiciled in this state, or a cor-
poration which is not organized under the laws of, and is not
licensed to do business in, this state."'1 5 The statute provides
102. La. Acts 1948, No. 132, §§ 1, 2, now LA. R.S. 13:3479-3482 (1950).
The statute was held constitutional in Tardiff v. Bank Line, Ltd., 127 F. Supp.
945 (E.D. La. 1954).
103. See Consolidated Credit Corp. v. Johnston, 152 So.2d 399 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963). In garnishment proceedings, service in the state on an employee of
the nonresident garnishee, when the garnishee was absent from his in-state place
of business, was held insufficient. The case is discussed in The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 term--Civil Procedure, 24 LA. L.
REV. 291 (1964). See also DeMorcy v. Keystone Exploration Co., 137 So.2d 68
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The court found no legislative provision for obtaining
valid service on a nonresident partnership except by service on an employee of
the partnership within the jurisdiction on partnership business. This case is dis-
cussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1961-1962 Term-
Civil Procedure, 23 LA. L. REV. 378, 379 (1963).
104. LA. R.S. 13:3201-3207 (Supp. 1964), added by La. Acts 1964, No. 47.
105. See Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure, Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, H.R.
Doc. No. 88 (Annex III), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1963).
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for service of process on those nonresidents by either registered
or certified mail, or by personal delivery by a person designated
by the Louisiana court or authorized by the law of the place
where service is made. 10 6 The nonresident is protected by a re-
quirement that no default judgment may be issued earlier than
thirty days after proof that the nonresident defendant has re-
ceived notice has been filed in the record.
0 7
The initial section of the statute 108 provides:
"A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the nonresident's
"(a) transacting any business in this state;
"(b) contracting to supply services or things in this
state;
"(c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission in this state;
"(d) causing injury or damage in this state by an of-
fense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission
outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business
or engages in other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from the goods used or consumed or
services rendered, in this state; or
"(e) having an interest in, using, or possessing a real
right or immovable property in this state."
Subsection (a) is broad enough to take full advantage of the
decision in McGee. It is intended to completely remove the prob-
lem of jurisdiction over nonresidents from the fetters of the "do-
ing business" test, and it is for this reason that "transacting" is
used rather than the overlimited cliche.
Subsection (e) presents a leap from the rule of Pennoyer.
It is confined to actions arising from the ownership of an inter-
est in, or the use or possession of, a real right or immovable
property.
106. LA. R.S. 13:3206 (Supp. 1964).
107. Id. 13:3204.
108. Id. 13:3205.
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Since these two provisions are the most indefinite of the five
included in the statute, and because of their novelty, it is im-
possible to determine at this time what scope will be given to
them. The other three provisions will cover most of the cases
requiring jurisdiction over nonresidents. It is with these situa-
tions - causes of action arising from contracts, and causes of
action arising from in-state and out-of-state tort - that the two
comments following are concerned.
David E. Soileau
JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM OVER CONTRACTS
WITH NONRESIDENTS
INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana State Law Institute, in drafting Louisiana's
"long-arm" statute, included three subsections which will affect
the in personam jurisdiction of Louisiana courts over causes of
action arising from contracts entered into by nonresidents. These
subsections relate to: the transacting of any business in this
state; contracting to supply services and things in this state;
and having an interest in, using, or possessing a real right or
immovable property in this state.' A subsection pertaining to
contracts of insurance was not included in the Louisiana statute
because the Louisiana Insurance Code 2 gives adequate coverage.3
Both nonresident individuals and non-licensed foreign corpora-
tions are included in the coverage of the statute.4 Nonresident
individuals have been held subject to local jurisdiction on the
same basis as corporations by state courts and lower federal
courts, and the position has been approved by the American Law
Institute.5
1. Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Statute, LA. R.S. 13:3201(a) (b) (e)
(Supp. 1964).
2. LA. R.S. 22:1-1734 (1950).
3. See notes 74-77 infra, and accompanying text.
4. Those corporations which have licenses to do business in the state are
not covered by this "long-arm" statute because, being licensed, they are subject
to the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts. See Comment (b) under LA. R.S. 13:3206
(Supp. 1964).
5. See Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New
Rule 4B, 24 MONT. L. REV. 3, 9 (1962). The definition of nonresident given
in LA. R.S. 13:3206 (Supp. 1964) includes individuals, partnerships, associa-
tions, and corporations not licensed to do business in Louisiana.
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